We introduce the concept of re ection principle as a knowledge representation paradigm in a computational logic setting. Re ection principles are expressed as certain kinds of logic schemata intended to capture the basic properties of the domain knowledge to be modeled. Re ection is then used to instantiate these schemata to answer speci c queries about the domain. This di ers from other approaches to re ection mainly in the following three ways. First, it uses logical instead of procedural re ection. Second, it aims at a cognitively adequate declarative representation of various forms of knowledge and reasoning, as opposed to re ection as a means for controlling computation or deduction. Third, it facilitates the building of a complex theory by allowing a simpler theory to be enhanced by a compact metatheory, contrary to the construction of metatheories that are only conservative extensions of the basic theory. A computational logic system for embedding re ection principles, called RCL (for Re ective Computational Logic), is presented in full detail. The system is an extension of Horn clause resolution-based logic, and is devised in a way that makes important features of re ection parametric as much as possible, so that they can be tailored according to speci c needs of di erent application domains. Declarative and procedural semantics of the logic are described and correctness and completeness of re ection as logical 1 inference are proved. Examples of re ection principles for three di erent application areas are shown. Relationship with a variety of distinct sources within the literature on relevant topics is discussed.
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Introduction
Re ective (or introspective, or self-referencing) systems have long been considered in many branches of logic and computer science, and more recently in their intersection area named computational logic or logic programming. Their importance and usefulness in logic 55, 56] and in theorem proving 38] , in computer science 30, 51, 60] , and in logic programming 7, 40, 47] has been generally recognised (see also 1, 11, 13, 32, 57] for snapshots of research).
The common intuitive notion of re ection in such di erent areas is that of an access relationship between theories or programs at the object level and theories or programs at the metalevel. The object level is intended to represent knowledge about some domain, whereas the metalevel is intended to represent knowledge about the object level itself.
Though this basic notion manifests itself in a variety of degrees, forms and purposes in the work referenced above, in most cases the aim of the metalevel has been viewed as a guide for the object level inference or computation, i.e., \for expressing`properties of control' in the same way as`properties of the domain' " 62] . In this paper instead we take a di erent view, as we are concerned with expressing the abstract features and properties of a problem domain via (a general and powerful form of) re ection.
We present a logical system whose main objective is to allow its users to specify and experiment with a variety of deductive systems, given through axioms and rules of inference. The system is called RCL, standing for \Re ective Computational Logic".
The syntax of the language (of the deductive systems that can be speci ed in RCL) is based on an enhanced Horn clause language, containing names for the expressions of the language itself. This makes it possible to specify deductive systems able to perform metareasoning and to represent knowledge and metaknowledge about a problem domain. The speci cation process is accomplished through the following four steps.
Step I In RCL, the rst step for specifying a deductive system (DS) is that of de ning its naming device (encoding). Encodings are formalised through equational theories (name theories). RCL leaves signi cant freedom in the representation of names. Therefore, users of RCL can explicitly make (to some extent) their own decisions about critical issues such as the representation of variables at the metalevel, or the choice of what syntactic entities to represent at the metalevel.
Step II After having de ned (whenever necessary) a suitable naming convention, the user of RCL has to provide a corresponding uni cation algorithm that is able to handle names and to relate names to what is named.
Step III The third step is to represent the axioms de ning the deductive system, DS, under consideration in the form of enhanced Horn clauses.
Step IV The last step for specifying DS is to represent the inference procedure.
In RCL, the speci cation of DS with its inference rules is executable, i.e., it can be directly used for deduction in DS. Moreover, the model-theoretic and xed point semantics of DS are obtained as a side e ect of the speci cation. Although re ection as a mean for extending logical theories has long been studied in the literature, the interpretation given here to this notion leads to a novel approach to de ning and using new inference rules. In particular, the user is required to express an inference rule R as a function R, called a re ection principle, from clauses, which constitute the antecedent of the rule, to sets of clauses, which constitute the consequent. Then, given a theory T consisting of a set of initial axioms A (enhanced Horn clauses) and of its deductive closure, and given a re ection principle R, a theory T 0 containing T is obtained as the deductive closure of A A 0 , where A 0 is the set of additional axioms generated by R. Consequently, the model-theoretic and xed point semantics of T under R are obtained as the model-theoretic and xed point semantics of T 0 . RCL however does not generate T 0 in the rst place. Rather, when queried about DS, RCL queries itself to generate the speci c additional axioms usable to answer the query, according to the given re ection principles (i.e., according to the inference rules of DS). In Section 2, after a review of the relevant literature, we introduce the de nition of re ection principle.
In order to exhibit this intended behaviour, RCL is built as a self-referential, re ective system, procedurally based on an extended resolution principle that implements re ection. The RCL system that we present falls within the logic programming approach. In fact, it extends the language of Horn clauses with the kind of facilities mentioned above, and extends the well-established semantics and proof theory of Horn clauses accordingly. We believe however that the underlying ideas could nd application also in in the context of other formalisms.
We intend to show that the proposed system is a practical, principled and powerful computational logic system.
The system is practical in that it gives its users two exible tools to construct their own representation and deduction forms rather than providing speci c ones.
For representation, as mentioned above, speci c encoding and substitution facilities are not prede ned and built into the system; rather, the system allows them to be user-de ned by means of name theories, i.e., sets of equational axioms with associated rewrite systems. The expressive power of encodings can therefore be traded against (computational and semantic) properties enjoyed by the associated rewrite systems in a maximally exible fashion, in order to tailor the system to the application domain at hand. This is introduced and discussed in Section 3.
Then, the integration of re ection principles into the declarative and procedural semantics of Horn clause theories is discussed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
The system is principled because its semantics and proof theory are formally dened in a way that is not a departure from classical Horn clause logic, as shown in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. Results of soundness and completeness of the proof theory with respect to the model theory are given in Section 5.
The system is powerful in a twofold sense. First, it is usually easier to represent domain knowledge by rst considering an initial core theory and then re ectively extending it by means of re ection principles, than to consider the whole theory all at once from the beginning. Second, and perhaps more important, re ection principles are epistemologically suitable for representing basic abstract properties of a problem domain, especially for some complex domains and sophisticated application areas. We argue in favour of this view in Section 6, where three domains are exempli ed and treated as case studies.
The rst deductive system that we de ne (Section 6.1) is a metalogic programming language, Re ective Prolog, that provides: (i) names, (ii) the possibility of de ning knowledge on multiple levels, and (iii) the possibility of exchanging knowledge between levels by means of a distinguished re ective predicate. Precisely, there is a certain predicate p in the language such that, for a class of formulae f of the language itself, the formula px(pfq)!f is true (where pf q denotes the encoding of f, and px denotes predicate p in the context of a substitution facility to replace variables x of f). p is called a re ective predicate, and is to be de ned as an approximation of a truth or proof predicate. The approximation has to be such that the intended useful features of self-reference are obtained, without running into the well-known paradoxes (see e.g., Perlis 55 ] for a discussion). We will show that two re ection principles are able to model the behaviour of a re ective predicate.
The second deductive system is able to represent agents and cooperation between multiple agents (Section 6.2). In particular, we consider rational agents that are introspective and communicative. A simple re ection principle models a quite general form of inter-agent communication.
The third deductive system (Section 6.3) is aimed at performing analogical reasoning. It is able to model a source domain representing knowledge which is certain and complete, and a target domain where knowledge is either uncertain or incomplete. Assuming that it can nd in the target domain some knowledge which is analogous to corresponding knowledge in the source domain, this deductive system is able (via a simple re ection principle) to apply analogy in performing deduction, thus drawing conclusions in the target domain which would have been impossible and incorrect to derive without the analogy.
A main aim of this research is that of de ning a well{founded theoretical framework, but also a foundation for a practically implemented system: practical feasibility has been taken into account while de ning all the aspects of the approach. Currently, an actual implementation is being designed, written in Re ective Prolog (of which a complete implementation exists, based on a Prolog meta{circular interpreter). The implementation is planned to have the following features: a default encoding device and some default re ection principles are included. The system however is intended to be parametrical w.r.t. this two components. Thus, the implementation will be adaptable to a speci c application domain by replacing the encoding device, and/or adding new re ection principles. In this case however, the implementation of these components is to be provided (in most cases by modifying the default one), along the lines speci ed in the paper (rewriting system for the encoding, extended resolution re ection principles). The system and its implementation are devised so that the components to be modi ed/extended are suitably encapsulated, in order to be easily managed, with limited risk of introducing unintended malfunctioning. We can say that, from a theoretical point of view, RCL is a framework for de ning new deductive systems, and from a practical point of view, its basic implementation should be a "toolkit" for easily obtaining the construction of these new systems.
The paper is concluded in Section 7, where we discuss the scope of the proposed approach and its limitations, examine areas of possible applications, and review pre-vious work in the literature and possible relationships to ours. Proofs of theorems are given in the Appendix.
2 Re ection and Re ection Principles
Background
In this section we recall the concepts we will be introducing and discussing, giving a basic historical background and perspective of the state of the art on these topics (the reader may also refer to 1, 3, 13, 32, 50, 57] for an overview.)
A computational system is a system that reasons and acts upon some domain. The system represents (some of the features of) its domain under the form of data, and prescribes how these data should be manipulated. The system is causally connected (to its domain) if the system and the domain are linked in such a way that any change in one of the two leads to some e ect upon the other. A system controlling a robot arm is a typical example of a causally connected system. This system may incorporate data representing the position of the arm. This data changes whenever the arm is moved by some external force; vice versa, if the system changes this data, then the robot arm changes to the corresponding position.
A metasystem is a system that has as domain another computational system, called object system, and has a representation (at the metalevel) of the features of the object system as data. Many examples of metasystems can be mentioned; an example is a compiler that is able to compile itself. Another well-known example is the notion of metainterpreter and partial evaluation, as used in Lisp and Prolog. A Prolog program, for instance, may incorporate a default metainterpreter that simulates at the metalevel (some of) the features of the underlying interpreter. Note that metainterpreters are written in the same language as the program they interpret. The default metainterpreter can be used as a basis for building a special-purpose metainterpreter. Metainterpreters can be used, for instance, in implementing: (i) variants of the language; (ii) enhanced control strategies; (iii) analysis and debugging tools; and (iv) auxiliary inference strategies, related to the application domain of the program at hand. The metainterpreter can then be partially evaluated and compiled together with the program it is designed for, thereby producing a special-purpose interpreter.
In the development of arti cial intelligence systems, metalevel formulations are ubiquitous, in that they have been used in a number of domains and with a wide variety of purposes and architectures (see e.g. 3, 70] for a comprehensive overview and classi cation). Recognized advantages of metalevel representations are in the possibility of separation between domain knowledge and control knowledge and of better mastering inference by explicit treatment of control. Metatheoretic concepts are suitable to express knowledge about how to perform generalizations, or about problem reformulation, or about inductive biases. More generally, they permit the concise statement of generalizations that are useful in problem-solving.
If a metasystem which acts on a representation of its own features is causally connected (to itself), then it is able to re ect or introspect, i.e., it is able to manipulate data representing itself in compliance with its semantics. Causal connection in this case means that the representation is linked in a consistent way to the represented objects.
The rst re ective system to appear in the literature is (to the best of our knowledge) the FOL system by Weyrauch 73] . In FOL, knowledge and metaknowledge are expressed in di erent contexts, and the user can access them both for expressing and inferring new facts. A FOL context consists of a language L (which is a rst-order language with sorts and conditional expressions) and a simulation structure S, which is a partial nite representation of some model. Causal connection is guaranteed by means of attachments, which are user-de ned explicit de nitions relating symbols in L with their interpretation in S. A special context named META describes the proof theory and some of the model theory of a FOL context C whose metatheory is META. The connection between C and META is established by the attachments and by a special linking rule that is applicable in both directions:
Theorem(pW q) W where W is any formula in the theory, pW q is a representation (a name) for W and Theorem(pW q) is a fact in the metatheory. By means of a special primitive, called Re ect, the linking rule can be explicitly applied by the user. Its e ect is either of re ecting up a formula W to the metatheory, so as to derive metatheorems involving pW q, or of re ecting down a metatheorem pW q, so that W becomes a theorem of the theory. Metatheorems can therefore be used as subsidiary deduction rules. The consistency and correctness of the application of Re ect is left to the user, as is the whole mechanism of contexts with attachments.
A seminal approach to re ection in the context of Horn clause language is MetaProlog, proposed by Bowen and Kowalski 12] . They propose to describe Horn clause syntax and provability in the logic itself by means of a careful version of the default metainterpreter (speci ed via a predicate Demo that is de ned by a set of axioms Pr), where all these aspects are made explicit. Also in this case, the connection between the object level and the metalevel is provided by linking rules for up and down re ection:
where`M and`L mean provability at the metalevel and at the object level, respectively, T is a Horn clause theory and A is an object level formula. As this approach is based on metainterpretation, the object language and the metalanguage are of course the same or, according to a popular terminology, they are amalgamated. In fact, the approach allows mixed object level and metalevel rules. Again, the application of the linking rules (which coincides, in practice, with the invocation of Demo) is left to the user, i.e., re ection is explicit. The semantics of this approach is, however, not easy to de ne (see e.g. 41, 26, 48, 53, 64] ), and holds only if the metatheory and the linking rules provide an extension to the basic Horn clause language which is conservative, i.e., only if Demo is a faithful representation of Horn clause provability. Although the amalgamated language is far more expressive than the object language alone, enhanced metainterpreters are (semantically) ruled out, since in that case the extension is non-conservative. This excludes the possibility of using Demo for expressing auxiliary deduction rules in a semantically sound way. The amalgamated approach has also been experimented by Attardi and Simi in Omega 5] . Omega is an object-oriented formalism for knowledge representation, which can deal with metatheoretical notions by including objects that describe Omega objects themselves and derivability in Omega.
3{Lisp 61] is another important example of an amalgamated re ective architecture. 3{Lisp is a metainterpreter for Lisp, or, more precisely, a metacircular interpreter that represents explicitly not only the control aspects, but also the data structures of the underlying interpreter. Here, the metalevel is accessible from the object level at run-time through a re ection act. The program is able to interrupt its computation, to change something with its interpretation, and to continue with a modi ed interpretation process. This kind of mechanism is called computational re ection. The semantics of computational re ection is procedural, however, rather than declarative. A re ective architecture conceptually similar to 3-Lisp has been proposed for the Horn clause language and has been fully implemented 15] .
A non-amalgamated approach in logic programming is G odel 42] (object theory and metatheory are distinct). G odel also provides a (conservative) provability predicate, a partial evaluation facility and an explicit form of re ection.
A project that extends and builds on both FOL and 3{Lisp is Getfol 34, 36] . It is developed on top of a reimplementation of FOL (therefore the approach is not amalgamated: the object theory and metatheory are distinct). Getfol is able to introspect its own code (lifting), to reason deductively about it in a declarative metatheory and, as a result, to produce new executable code that can be pushed back to the underlying interpretation ( attening). The architecture is based on a sharp distinction between deduction (FOL style) and computation (3{Lisp style). The main objective of Getfol seems to be that of implementing theorem-provers, given its ability of implementing exible control strategies to be adapted (via re ection) to the particular situation. Similarly to FOL, the kind of reasoning performed in GETFOL consists in : (i) performing some reasoning at the metalevel; (ii) using the results of this reasoning to assert facts in the object level. An interesting extension is, however, that of applying this concept to a system with multiple theories and multiple languages (each theory formulated in its own language) 35], where the two steps are reinterpreted as (i) doing some reasoning in one theory and (ii) jumping into another theory to do some more reasoning on the basis of what has been derived in the previous theory. These two deductions are concatenated by the application of bridge rules, which are inference rules where the premises belong to the language of the former theory, and the conclusion belongs to the language of the latter.
From the point of view of semantics, we may notice that an explicit re ection that extends the inference relation of the object level disturbs the (classical) object level semantics: by downward re ection, facts and/or formulas are added that are not logically entailed by the available object level knowledge. In order to face this problem, Hoek et al. 68] and Treuer 67] adopt temporal logics and epistemic states of knowledge. Moreover, metalevel computation may in general be costly 69], and explicit re ection certainly is a potential source of ine ciency (especially whenever it is based on some form of metainterpretation). With explicit re ection and ine cient metalevel computation, metalevel knowledge will most often play a secondary role w.r.t. object level knowledge.
To overcome these problems, a di erent concept of re ection has been incorporated into Re ective Prolog 19, 22] , a self-referential Horn clause language with logical reection. The objective of this approach was that of developing a more expressive and powerful language, while preserving the essential features of logic programming: Horn clause syntax, model-theoretic semantics, resolution via uni cation as procedural semantics, correctness and completeness properties. To investigate the relation between this kind of logical re ection and the corresponding model-theoretic semantics, an interpreter of Re ective Prolog has been fully implemented 27]. In Re ective Prolog, Horn clauses are extended with self-reference and resolution is extended with logical re ection, in order to achieve greater expressive and inference power. The re ection mechanism is implicit, i.e., the interpreter of the language automatically re ects upwards and downwards. This allows reasoning and metareasoning to interleave without the user's intervention, so as to exploit both knowledge and metaknowledge in proofs (in most of the other approaches, instead, there is one level which is \ rst{class", where deduction is actually performed and the other level which plays a secondary role). The re ection mechanism is embedded in both the procedural and the declarative semantics of the language, that is, in the extended resolution procedure which is used by the interpreter and in the construction of the models which give meanings to programs. Procedurally, this implies that there is no need to axiomatize provability in the metatheory. Object level reasoning is not simulated by metainterpreters but directly executed by the language interpreter, thus avoiding unnecessary ine ciency. The formal semantics is de ned in correspondence to the behavior of the interpreter: a theory composed of an object level and (one or more) metalevels is semantically regarded as an enhanced theory, enriched by new axioms which are entailed by the given theory and by the linking rules interpreted as axiom schemata. Therefore, in Re ective Prolog, language and metalanguage are amalgamated in a non-conservative extension, though avoiding semantic problems. Re ective Prolog has been proposed as an enhanced knowledge-representation language 24]. In order to compare Getfol and Re ective Prolog, as recent fully implemented systems, we may note that: re ection in Getfol gives access to a metatheory where many features of the system are made explicit, even the code that implements the system itself. In contrast, re ection in Re ective Prolog gives access to a metatheory where various kinds of metaknowledge can be expressed, either about the application domain or about the behaviour of the system; deduction in GETFOL consists in performing some reasoning at the metalevel and then asserting facts at the object level. Deduction in Re ective Prolog means using at each step either metalevel or object level knowledge, in a continuous interleaving between levels: i.e., both levels are \ rst{class" in the deductive process; metareasoning in Getfol implies de ning explicit syntactic manipulation of descriptions, while metareasoning in Re ective Prolog implies a declarative denition of metaknowledge, which is automatically integrated into deductions. This corresponds to the di erent aims of the two systems: theorem-proving for Getfol and knowledge representation for Re ective Prolog.
The Concept of Re ection Principle
The idea of re ection in logic dates back to work by Feferman 31] . He introduced the concept of a re ection principle de ned as: \a description of a procedure for adding to any set of axioms A certain new axioms whose validity follow from the validity of the axioms A and which formally express within the language of A evident consequences of the assumption that all the theorems of A are valid."
Thus, in Feferman's view, re ection principles do not generate arbitrary consequences, but rather a transposition of the original ones. In RCL, we reinterpret the concept of a re ection principle as: \a description of a procedure for adding to any set of axioms A certain new axioms whose validity follow from some user-de ned inference rules." We use re ection principles to integrate into the (declarative and procedural) semantics of the Horn clause theories the inference rules of a deductive system DS that a user wants to de ne. Inference rules are, by de nition, decidable relations between formulae of a language L, and can be expressed in the form of axiom schemata. These schemata need however to be given a role in the theory, both semantically (obtaining a semantics for the resulting theory) and syntactically (making them usable in deduction). We choose to interpret them as procedures, more precisely as functions that transform Horn clauses into (sets of) Horn clauses. These new Horn clauses are called \re ection axioms". Thus, the di erence with respect to Feferman's notion of re ection principles is that the validity of the re ection axioms is not necessarily a formal consequence of the validity of the given axioms. In fact, a user could de ne also non-standard inference rules, to encode various forms of uncertain or plausible reasoning. Nevertheless, in a given application context, where a new inference rule is introduced to capture some speci c aspects of the domain under consideration, the validity of re ection axioms should follow conceptually, according to the intended meaning of the extension.
The advantage of representing inference rules in the form of re ection principles is that the model-theoretic and xed point semantics of the given theory under the new inference rule coincides with the corresponding semantics 44] of the plain Horn clause theory obtained from the given theory, augmented by the re ection axioms.
The advantage of applying re ection principles on a single clause is that the re ection axioms need not be generated in the beginning, but can be generated dynamically, whenever a re ection principle is applicable to the input clause of any resolution step.
In this and the following Sections, we present a formalization of the proposed concept of re ection which should constitute a simple way of understanding re ective programs as well as a description of how re ection allows one to uniformly treat di erent application areas. The applications of re ection that we have previously studied (and reported in detail elsewhere 20, 24, 25] ) are instances of the new formalization. Thus we are able to present them as case studies and show how RCL can constitute a uniform framework for several problem domains.
For each of those areas, we present the re ection principles suitable to capture the speci city of the problem domain. Given a basic theory expressing a particular problem in that domain, its extension determined by the chosen re ection principle contains the consequences intended by that principle, but not entailed by the basic theory alone. Thus, this use of re ection is di erent in essence from previous use of re ection rules in logic programming, such as in 12]. Our conception and use of re ection principles are precisely aimed at making the set of theorems that are provable from the basic theory, augmented with re ection axioms, di er from the set of theorems that are provable from the basic theory alone. This capability allows one to model several forms of reasoning within the same formal framework. The version of RCL presented in this paper is monotonic, in the sense that re ection principles enlarge the set of consequences of the basic theory. The use of re ection in nonmonotonic reasoning is discussed by Costantini and Lanzarone 23] . Their approach can be integrated in RCL (at the expense of some semantic complications).
Notice that re ection principles allow one to formalize how conclusions follow one from the other, not necessarily between an object theory and a metatheory (in the latter case you need an encoding device). Re ection principles express inference rules to be applied within the same theory, or even to link di erent theories (similarly to the bridge rules of Giunchiglia and Sera ni 35]).
De nition 1 Let C be a de nite clause. A re ection principle R is a mapping from de nite clauses to ( nite) sets of de nite clauses. The clauses in R(C) are called re ection axioms.
Given a de nite program P = fC 1 ; : : : ; C n g, we write R(P) for R(C 1 ) : : : R(C n ).
The following example, although very simple, informally illustrates the main idea.
Example 2 Suppose we want to incorporate into a theory T the ability to reason about \provability" in the theory itself. To do this, we can introduce a predicate demo de ned over representations of propositions in T itself, such that demo holds for all those representations for which the corresponding propositions are provable. This can be formalised as: i demo(p i q) where p i q indicates the name of i . Thus, demo(p i q) is provable in the theory whenever proposition i is. In RCL, the inference rule above can be incorporated by means of the following re ection principle R:
Assume that T contains the following initial set of axioms: A = f 1 ; 2 ; 3 demo(p 2 q)g: Then, the set A 0 of re ection axioms generated by R is:
The deductive closure of A A 0 is the theory:
T 0 = f 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; demo(p 1 q); demo(p 2 q); demo(p 3 q)g:
Notice that several re ection principles can co-exist in the same framework. This is the case of the application outlined in Section 6.1.
Re ection principles allow extensions to be made to the language of Horn clauses by modifying the program but leaving the underlying logic unchanged. A potential drawback is that the resulting program (P R(P); E) may have, in general, a large number of clauses, which is allowed in principle but di cult to manage in practice. To avoid this problem, re ection principles are applied in the inference process only as necessary, thus computing the re ection axioms \on the y". (This means that we do not create A 0 or A A 0 explicitly.) Given a re ection principle R, we hereafter write R to indicate any procedure that is able to compute R. It is important to notice that R can be any suitable formal system for the application at hand. In particular, R may be a metaprogram in some metalogic language. In RCL, whenever its users de ne a re ection principle R, they must provide R , and they are responsible for it being a correct implementation of R.
The antecedent of the inference rule expressed as a re ection principle being a single Horn clause is not really a limitation. In fact, by de ning a suitable name theory, the given clause may encode any set of formulae. The consequent being a set of Horn clauses is an actual limitation. In fact, in this sense RCL is not a departure from the traditional logic programming approach, as user-de ned inference rules can express only what can be expressed (either at the object level or at the metalevel) by means of Horn clauses.
The enhanced Horn Clause language
The distinction between use and mention of a term, or between language and metalanguage, and the technique of giving names to language expressions in order to be able to talk about their properties, both belong to the tradition of philosophical and mathematical logic.
Since our aim is to devise a language that is both cognitively adequate and practically usable, in this section we rst motivate the use of names and then introduce the technicalities by which they can be de ned in a suitable and exible way.
Notice that giving names to language expressions is the only way to have both language and metalanguage while staying within rst-order logic, which is a strongly desirable property in a computational setting.
In the following, a \ground term" is a term not containing variables. Consequently, di erent approaches to giving names to expressions can be divided into \ground" naming approaches, where names are ground terms, and \non{ground" naming approaches, where names are terms that may contain variables.
Use and Mention
In a language there is a clear distinction between a thing and its name: we use names to talk about things. However, when we want to mention expressions, rather than using them, confusion can arise (see e.g. Suppes 65 ] for a discussion on this topic). Consider the following statements:
California is a state.
(1) California has ten letters.
`California' is a state.
(3) California' has ten letters.
The statements (1) and (4) are true, while (2) and (3) are false. To say that the state-name in question has ten letters we must use not the name itself, but a name of it. The name of an expression is commonly formed by putting the named expression between quotation marks. The whole, called a quotation, denotes its internal content. This device is used, for example, in statement (3). Every name denotes a thing.
For example, California denotes the well-known american state. Names of things can also be seen as things themselves denoted by other names (i.e., quotations), likè California'. The reading of statement (3) can be clari ed by rephrasing it as:
The word`California' is a state. (3) is about a word which (1) contains, and (1) is about no word at all, but a state. In (1) the state-name is used, while in (4) a quotation is used and the state-name is mentioned. To mention California we use`California' or a synonym, and to mentioǹ California' we use``California' ' or a synonym. We could also baptise the word`California' with a personal name. Let
Then the following statements could be true,
Jeremiah is a name of a state. (6) Jeremiah has ten letters.
(7) Jeremiah' has eight letters.
while the next is false`J eremiah' is a name of a state.
Statement (9) could be rendered true by inserting another`name of' in it Jeremiah' is a name of a name of a state.
Thus, by quoting an expression we can ascribe di erent kinds of properties to it: for example, morphological properties as in statement (4) or phonetic and grammatical properties as in the following.`B oston' is disyllabic.
(10) Boston' is a noun.
We can also ascribe semantic properties, that is, properties that arise from the meaning of the expression.
Boston' designates the capital of Massachusetts.
(12) Boston' is synonymous with`the capital of Massachusetts'. (13) Notice that in (13) quotations can be synonymous, while places cannot.
As Quine points out 59], the use of quotation marks is the main practical measure against confusing objects with their names. Frege was the rst logician to use quotation marks formally to distinguish use and mention of expressions (see Carnap 14] for further discussion).
Quotations can also be applied to non-atomic expressions. For example, to say that a statement has a given property, e.g., the semantic property of truth or falsehood, we attach the appropriate predicate to the name of the statement in question, and not to the statement itself. Thus, we may write:
Margus is Estonian' is true.
Margus is Estonian is true. (15) (14) is a statement, while (15) is not. Notice that in (14) we use a predicate to speak about another statement, therefore we mention it. In contrast, logical connectives attach to statements (and not to names of statements) to form more complex statements, and this application can be iterated.
Quanti ers standing outside of quotes cannot bind variables occurring inside quotes because by quoting a variable we mention it. Consider the following statement:
For every p,`p' is the sixteenth letter of the alphabet.
(16) This sentence can be considered to be true, and the quanti er For every p to be redundant and not binding the occurrence of p inside the quotes. In contrast, if we were to regard the quanti er as binding the occurrence of p in quotes, we would obtain, replacing p by Margus is Estonian, the false assertion:
Margus is Estonian' is the sixteenth letter of the alphabet.
(17) Tarski 66] , for example, de nes names as variable-free terms. He discusses two kinds of names: quotation-mark (or primitive) and structural descriptive names. The former category associates with a formula a \monolithic" term as its name (G odel's encoding is an example of this kind of naming). The latter category associates with a formula a structured ground term that re ects the structure of the sentence it names. The advantage of structural descriptive names over quotation-mark names is that they allow us to quantify over parts of expressions.
Names have been widely used in computational logic. In a formal language, we can have names of formulae, but also, more generally, names of elements of the language that we can call expressions. The association between expressions and names is usually called a naming relation. The domain of a naming relation is a subset of the set of all language expressions, and possibly includes predicate, function and variable symbols, terms, atoms, single formulae as well as sets of formulae. Theories in the language may also have names. Some expressions may have primitive names, some others structural descriptive ones. In principle, an expression may have more than one name. In practice, however, naming relations are typically functional and injective (see van Harmelen 71] for a discussion on the properties of naming relations).
A name is itself an expression in a formal language. The operation which results in obtaining the name of an expression (or, more generally, in relating a name with what it names) has been called quotation, or referentiation, or rei cation, or encoding. The converse operation is usually called unquotation or de-referentiation. When expressions that de ne names are terms of a language, they are called name terms. Whenever names of expressions in a given formal language are expressed in the language itself, i.e., whenever a language is capable of self-reference, we call it a metalogic language. A theory expressed in a metalogic language therefore consists of the object level, composed of object formulae not containing name terms and of the metalevel, consisting of formulae containing name terms. Formulae of the metalevel express some kind of syntactic or semantic properties of object formulae (as outlined in the simple examples above), and thus express some kind of metaknowledge, that can be used in deduction in various ways, thus performing metareasoning. The reader may refer to 2, 3, 24] for a discussion about possible uses of metaknowledge and metareasoning.
Notice that it is somewhat controversial whether a language should be capable of self{reference, or if names should be encoded in a separate metalanguage. As discussed in Section 2.1, the two points of view have led to systems where the object and the metalevels are separated (e.g., FOL, GETFOL, G odel) or amalgamated (e.g., 3{Lisp, MetaProlog, Re ective Prolog). In our opinion, and in our experience, amalgamated approaches are in order for applications in knowledge representation, where expressing knowledge about a domain means also expressing properties which can be seen in one perspective as properties of the domain, and in another perspective as (syntactic metalevel) properties of knowledge itself.
In the next section, we will rst extend the Horn clause language to a more general language able to express name terms. Then, we will show how user-de ned naming relations can be expressed by means of the axioms of an equality theory. With this aim, we will consider some examples taken from the recent literature; in fact, we will show how to de ne the encoding used in some existing metalogic languages. Finally, we will consider how to extend uni cation so as to accommodate names. In this direction, we consider the formalization of the uni cation algorithm in terms of a rewrite system and then show how to extend this rewrite system to cope with equality theories de ning names.
A Metalanguage
We extend the language HC of Horn clauses to an enhanced language HC + containing names of the expressions of the language itself. As we will see, HC + allows signi cant freedom in the choice of names: we only require that names of compound expressions be compositional, i.e., that the name of a compound expression must be obtained from the names of its components. In this language, it is possible to express various forms of encoding, both ground and non-ground, each of them with an associated rewrite system. We remind the reader that in a ground representation each syntactic expression is represented by means of a ground term. In contrast, non-ground representations do not require groundness of names.
The language is that of de nite programs, as de ned by Lloyd 49] , except that terms are de ned di erently, in order to include names (called name terms) that are intended to represent the symbols and the expressions of the language itself.
The alphabet of HC + di ers from the usual alphabet of de nite programs by making a distinction between variables and metavariables and through the presence of metaconstants. . Similarly, if c n , with n > 0, is a metaconstant (i.e., c n is c named n times), then its name is written as c n+1 . Furthermore, the alphabet of HC + contains two operators, " and #, and a distinguished predicate symbol, =. The operators " and # are intended to denote the operations of quoting and unquoting, respectively. The symbols ", #, and = play a special role in the extended SLD-resolution and we assume that there are no symbols naming them.
Where not otherwise stated, the lower-case characters x, y and z (possibly indexed) are used for variables, while the upper-case characters X, Y and Z (possibly indexed) are used for metavariables. Thus x and y 3 , for example, are variables, and Z and X 3 are metavariables. Sometimes, to abbreviate the notation of expressions we use the notation reserved for variables to indicate both variables and metavariables, and we explicitly state this use.
The What we need now is a way to formalise the relation between terms and the corresponding name terms. We do this by formalising the intended role of the operators " and # through equational theories that are a parameter of RCL. Example 3 Often it is useful to access information as a sequence of characters, represented in the program as a constant. In Prolog, for example, there is a built-in predicate, name, that relates constants and their ASCII encodings.
There are two typical uses of name: (i) given a constant, break it down into single characters, (ii) given a list of characters, combine them into a constant. An example of a rst kind of application would be a predicate that is true when a constant starts with a certain character. This may be de ned in HC 
Formalizing Encodings
In order to name in HC + expressions of the language itself we employ an encoding. Encodings can represent various kinds of information: syntactic information, computational information, epistemological information, etc. (for an overview of encodings, cf. van Harmelen 72] ). In general it is not possible to nd an encoding that is optimal for all metalevel theories. This is because the syntactic richness of the encoding determines not only the expressivity of the metatheory, but also its complexity. Therefore, the encoding should be adapted to the particular requirements of a given metatheory, and/or to the application domain at hand. This motivates the choice, made in our formal framework, to provide the encoding as a separately de nable component.
With this aim, encodings can be expressed by means of equational theories, and the related substitution facility by means of a rewrite system. There are some formal properties that the associated rewrite systems must satisfy when integrated into a computational framework. We have de ned a comprehensive methodology for formalising encodings in this way 8, 28] .
The following examples show the formalisation of some encodings appearing in the literature. This in order to show the applicability of the approach, and to see how the axiomatization can constitute a basis for investigating properties, advantages and disadvantages of a given naming device.
Example 4 Various encodings can be axiomatized by an equality theory: for example, a simple one where no information at all is included in any name. The encoding axiomatized by the following axiom corresponds to the non-ground encoding (identity function) typically used in Prolog metainterpreters 63].
8x "x = x: (18) This encoding seems to have the advantage of simplicity, but, unfortunately, strongly reduces the expressive power of the metatheory. It is not possible, for example, to use a uni cation procedure for constructing names of expressions and accessing parts of them, as the name of the function symbol of a term is again a function symbol. A possible solution to this problem could be that of replacing axiom (18) above with the following two axioms.
For every constant c, (19) "c = c:
For every function symbol f of arity k, (20) 8x 1 : : : 8x k "(f(x 1 ; : : : ; x k )) = f; "x 1 ; : : : ; "x k ]:
In (20) the symbol f appearing to the left of equality is a function symbol, while the f appearing to the right of equality is a metaconstant. One advantage of using such overloading of names is that the rewrite system for such axioms can be very simple and e cient, but, on the other hand, ambiguous cases arise. Suppose, for example, that we want to nd what the name term f; t 1 ; : : : ; t k ] names. Then we have an ambiguity because it could be either a name term of the form f; s 1 ; : : : ; s k ] or a term of the form f(s 1 ; : : : ; s k ). (Jiang introduces an ambivalent logic 45] where he tackles this problem by making no distinction between sentences and terms.) For many metaprograms, however, such a representation is inadequate for other reasons: it does not allow us to investigate the instantiation of variables in queries. Actually, many kinds of metaprograms need to reason about the computational behaviour of the object program. In this case, a ground encoding appears to be more suitable.
The next example shows a simple form of ground encoding de ned similarly to the G odel numbering .
Example 5 De ne rst an exponent to be any natural number of the form 2 n , for some n 0, and an assignment to be any injective mapping from a nite subset of the set of variables and metavariables into the set of all exponents. We write assignments as fx 1 =n 1 ; : : : ; x k =n k g, and by using this notation we assume that all variables and metavariables x i are distinct and all exponents n i are also distinct.
Let t be a term and x 1 ; : : : ; x n be all variables and metavariables of t. Let be an assignment. The G odel number (t) of t under is de ned similarly to the G odel numbering : Then, given an assignment , the ground representation of t under is "(t ).
Although simple and sound, the above encoding is inadequate for most knowledge{ representation and computational purposes. A main property that a naming device should in fact in our opinion exhibit is compositionality: i.e., since a term is constructed (and deconstructed) by composing (decomposing) subterms, its name should correspondingly be constructed (and deconstructed) by composing (decomposing) names of subterms. The axioms below for the operators " and # are the basis of the formalisation of the relationship between terms and the corresponding name terms. These axioms form a part of the equality theory for any ground encoding which is meant to be compositional. They just say that there exist names of names (each term can be referenced n times, for any n 0) and that the name of a compound term must be a function of the names of its components.
The axioms of the following equality theory, called NT and rst de ned in 28], characterize name terms and compositional names for HC + .
De nition 6 Let NT be the following equality theory. For every compound name term X 0 ; X 1 ; : : : ; X k ] 8X 0 : : : 8X k " X 0 ; X 1 ; : : : ; X k ] = "X 0 ; "X 1 ; : : : ; "X k ]. 8x #"x = x. 8X "#X = X.
The simple examples above illustrate that an encoding directly determines the expressivity of the metatheory. If we consider an encoding that provides little information to the metalevel, then we can design e cient rewrite systems for that encoding; but, on the other hand, the expressivity of the metatheory is low (this is the case for an encoding along the lines of Example 4).
When an encoding has been established as being suitable for an application, its properties for sound and complete inference should be investigated. (In Section 5 we study what properties are required of a rewrite system for a suitable integration into a computational mechanism.) For example, encodings employing variable names result in a loss of completeness (see example below). However, such encodings allow the state of the computation (e.g., the instantiation of variables in queries) to be inspected. This capability is needed, for example, in applications that are mainly aimed at syntactic metaprogramming, like program manipulation and transformation via metaprograms. Thus, one may choose this last kind of encoding if these capabilities are important, provided that one is aware that certain other properties are lost. Furthermore, we observe that encodings in uence the semantics of metalogic languages. In fact, metalanguages that are based on formally de ned encodings have clear and well-de ned declarative semantics. In contrast, giving a semantic account of a metalogic programming language that employs a trivial encoding is remarkably more di cult. This is easy to see for metainterpreters, whose encoding mechanism has been outlined in Example 4. The di culties associated with providing them with a reasonable semantics have been discussed in length by Barklund et al. 9 ].
The RCL system provides a default encoding which is compositional, and does not provide names for variables. The default encoding is in particular the one described in De nition 6. The system is however intended to be parametrical w.r.t. the naming device, i.e., the implementation can be adapted to the application domain at hand by replacing the default encoding with a new one. The new encoding should be de ned along the lines given in this Section, and implemented as speci ed in the next Section (in most cases the new implementation will result in a modi cation of the existing one). Notice that we allow names, names of names, and so on. It is not easy to understand whether this could give problems such as circularity or unsoundness. This question is however solved by studying the properties of the rewrite system associated with the encoding, as illustrated in the following Section.
An E-uni cation Algorithm
In the context of equational logic programming, uni cation algorithms are usually expressed in terms of transformation systems based on sets of equations rather than on substitutions. In order to take into account names of the metalanguage HC + , we de ne an E-uni cation algorithm based on a rewrite system for a given equality theory E. To do this, we need some de nitions (in the rest of the paper we will use the terminology of Dershowitz 
and Jouannaud 29]).
A rewrite rule over a set of terms is an ordered pair hl; ri of terms, which we write as l!r. The idea of rewriting is to impose directionality on the use of equations in proofs. A ( nite) set R of rewrite rules is called a rewrite system.
We write the subterm of t rooted at position p as tj p . = y that is a binding and can therefore be processed by eliminate. The second, mutate, allows us to compute names with respect to a given rewrite system R. If a name equation e contains a redex ej p reducible to t, i.e., ej p ! R t, then mutate replaces ej p in e with t. Finally, the rules freeze and unfreeze move name equations from S to F, and vice versa. If a name equation x = t is irreducible, that is, t is not in normal form and contains names that cannot be computed, then freeze moves x = t to the set F. Such an equation remains in F until it becomes reducible, which is eventually allowed by means of a substitution applied to F by eliminate. At this point, unfreeze moves x = t back to S, where it can subsequently be reduced.
De nition 8 Given a rewrite system R, an E-uni cation algorithm, written as =) R , is any procedure that takes a nite set S 0 of equations, and uses the above transformation system to generate sequences of tuples from hfg; fg; S 0 i. Starting with hfg; fg; S 0 i and using the rules above until none is applicable results in hH; F; Si, where S 6 = fg, if and only if S 0 has no solution, or otherwise it results in a solved form hH; F; fgi, where H is a Herbrand assignment and F is a solvable set of irreducible name equations. Since the application of any of these rules preserves all solutions, the former situation corresponds to failure, while in the latter case a most general uni er can be extracted from H. For sake of simplicity, we have not speci ed the transformation rules needed to transform irreducible name equations in F to a solvable form. In any case, such a solvable form for F exists 28] De nition 10 Let E be an equality theory. A system of rules is sound for E if every rule in it preserves the set of all E-solutions.
The following four results are proved in 28].
Proposition 11 Given an equality theory E and a rewrite system R E adequate for E, the E-uni cation algorithm =) R E is sound for E and terminating.
Proposition 12 Let R be a rewrite system. If R is convergent, then the E-uni cation algorithm =) R converges.
We presents now a rewrite system based on the equality theory NT of De nition 6.
Recall that we write c n to indicate a constant c named n times; thus, c may be written as c 0 , its name as c 1 , and so on.
De nition 13 Let UN be the following rewrite system. Let n 0.
"c n ! c n+1 "f(x1;:::;xn) ! f 1 ; "x1;:::; 
E-interpretations
In this section we parametrize the semantics of the traditional Horn clause language w.r.t. an equality theory E. To this aim the problem is that, whenever a semantics is de ned over the Herbrand universe U, equality is interpreted by default as syntactic identity. To overcome this restriction, Ja ar et al. 43] proposed the use of quotient universes. Here we adapt this technique to our context.
De nition 17 Let R be a congruence relation. The quotient universe of U with respect to R, indicated as U=R, is the set of the equivalence classes of U under R, i.e., the partition given by R in U. Given an equality theory E, there is an in nite number of models of E. For E to have a canonical model, there must exist a congruence relation R such that E j = s = t i dse R = dte R where dse R and dte R denote the R-equivalence classes of the ground term s and t, i.e., dse R = fx j x R sg. This can be achieved only if the equality theory has a \ nest" congruence relation (in the sense of set inclusion). Ja ar et al. showed that each consistent (Horn clause) equality theory generates a nest congruence relation R 0 (the intersection of all congruence relations that are models of E). As a consequence, it holds that (P; E) j = A i P j = U=R0 A where (P; E) is a logic program, A is a ground atom and j = U=R0 denotes logical implication in the context of U=R 0 . Thus we can work in a xed domain which is the canonical domain for (P; E).
In the following, we write U=E for U=R 0 , dse for the element in U=E assigned to the ground term s and, for any predicate symbol p, we write dp(t 1 ; : : : ; t n )e as a shorthand for p(dt 1 e; : : : ; dt n e).
We can now introduce the de nitions of E-base, E-interpretation and E-model of a logic program (P; E).
De nition 18 The E-base B (P;E) of a logic program (P; E) is the set of all atoms which can be formed by using predicate symbols from the language of (P; E) with elements from the quotient universe U=E as arguments.
De nition 19 An E-interpretation of a logic program (P; E) is any subset of B (P;E) . De nition 20 Let I be an E-interpretation. Then I E-satis es a ground de nite clause A e 1 ; : : : ; e q ; A 1 ; : : : ; A m if and only if at least one of the following conditions hold:
1. E 6 j = e i , for some i, 1 i q, 2. dA j e 6 2 I, for some j, 1 j m, or 3. dAe 2 I. De nition 21 Let I be an E-interpretation of a logic program (P; E). Then I Esatis es (P; E) if and only if I E-satis es each ground instance of every clause in P. If there exists an E-interpretation I which E-satis es (P; E), then (P; E) is E-satis able, otherwise (P; E) is E-unsatis able.
De nition 22 Let I be an E-interpretation of a logic program (P; E). Then I is an E-model of (P; E) if and only if I E-satis es (P; E).
De nition 23 A ground atom A is a logical E-consequence of a logic program (P; E) if, for every E-interpretation I, I is an E-model of (P; E) implies that dAe 2 I.
The least E-model of a logic program (P; E) can be characterized as the least xed point of a mapping T (P;E) over E-interpretations 43] , written as lfp(T (P;E) ). Let ground(P ) be the set of all ground instances of clauses in P.
De nition 24 Let I be an E-interpretation of a logic program (P; E). Then T (P;E) is de ned as follows:
T (P;E) (I) = f dAe : (A e 1 ; : : : ; e q ; A 1 ; : : : ; A m ) 2 ground(P ); E j = e i for 1 i q; dA j e 2 I for 1 j m g
The following result is proved by Ja ar et al. 43 ].
Theorem 25 M (P;E) = lfp(T (P;E) ) = T (P;E) " !.
In summary, we have de ned an enhanced Horn clause language HC + which allows users to introduce their own naming convention by means of an equality theory E. The semantics of HC + is, up to now, just the semantics of the traditional Horn clause language, which has been made parametrical w.r.t. E by means of the technique of quotient universes. This is the rst step of the de nition of RCL, in which we have provided users with a language powerful enough to represent knowledge and metaknowledge in a deductive system DS. Then, we have to provide the possibility of de ning the inference rules of DS and performing deductions in DS. With this aim, in Section 2 we have introduced a formal device, that we have called re ection, for de ning new inference rules and integrating them into SLD-resolution. The novelty of the approach is precisely that newly dened inference rules are immediately \executable", in the context of a declarative and procedural semantics which do not depart from the usual ones. In fact, the following sections give a model-theoretic and functional characterization of logic programs with naming and re ection, and present an extension to SLD-resolution that takes re ection principles into consideration. 4 Re ective Semantics
Re ective E-models and Fixed Point Semantics
We use the following de nitions.
De nition 26 Let R be a re ection principle and I an E-interpretation of a logic program (P; E). Then I re ectively E-satis es (P; E) (with respect to R) if and only if I E-satis es (P R(P); E). De nition 27 If there exists an E-interpretation I that re ectively E-satis es a logic program (P; E), then (P; E) is re ectively E-satis able, otherwise (P; E) is re ectively E-unsatis able.
De nition 28 Let I be an E-interpretation of a logic program (P; E). Then I is a re ective E-model of (P; E) if and only if I re ectively E-satis es (P; E).
Re ective E-models are clearly models in the usual sense 44], as they are obtained by extending a given logic program (P; E) with a set of de nite clauses. Therefore the model intersection property still holds and there exists a least re ective E-model of (P; E), indicated as M R (P;E) . It entails the consequences of (P; E), the additional consequences drawn by means of the re ection axioms, and the further consequences obtained from both. M R (P;E) is in general not minimal as an E-model of (P; E), but it is minimal with respect to the set of consequences which can be drawn from both the logic program and the re ection axioms.
De nition 29 A ground atom A is a re ective logical E-consequence of a logic program (P; E) if, for every E-interpretation I, I is a re ective E-model for (P; E) implies that dAe 2 I. Given a logic program (P; E) and a de nite goal G, we hereafter write (P; E) fGg for (P fGg; E) to enhance readability. Proposition 30 Let (P; E) be a logic program and A 1 ; : : : ; A k a ground de nite goal. Then (P; E) f A 1 ; : : : ; A k g is re ectively E-unsatis able if and only if A 1^: : :^A k is a re ective logical E-consequence of (P; E). is continuous over this class, and the class of re ective E-models is given by fI j T R De nition 35 Let 
SLD R -resolution
It is well known how to reformulate SLD-resolution over de nite programs in terms of sets of equations rather than substitutions (see, e.g., Clark 17] Now we can extend SLD-resolution to take into consideration a re ection principle R. We call the extended SLD-resolution SLD R -resolution. Given a re ection principle R and an equality theory E, we write R to indicate any procedure that computes R, and R E to indicate any rewrite system adequate for E.
De nition 38 Let R be a re ection principle and (P; E) a logic program. Let hM fp(t 1 ; : : : ; t n )g; H; Fi be a state. Given a variant C of a de nite clause in P, the state hM fA 1 ; : : : ; A m g; H 0 ; F 0 i is derived from hM fp(t 1 ; : : : ; t n )g; H; Fi and C by using R and R E if either (a) C is p(t 0 1 ; : : : ; t 0 n ) e 1 ; : : : ; e q ; A 1 ; : : : ; A m or (b) (p(t 0 1 ; : : : ; t 0 n ) e 1 ; : : : ; e q ; A 1 ; : : : ; A m ) 2 R (C), and hH; F; ft 1 = t 0 1 ; : : : ; t n = t 0 n ; e 1 ; : : : ; e q gi =) R E hH 0 ; F 0 ; fgi.
The rst case (a) corresponds to the operations of the modi ed SLD-resolution discussed above. The second case (b) is based on the use of re ection axioms obtained by means of R .
The additional inference rule could also be added to other inference systems for de nite programs that have provisions for delaying computation.
An SLD R -derivation is a ( nite or in nite) path in the tree of states above. An SLD R -refutation is a nite path in the tree ending with a success state.
De nition 39 Let R be a re ection principle, (P; E) a logic program and G a de nite goal. An SLD R -derivation of (P; E) fGg consists of a ( nite or in nite) sequence of states hM; fg; fgi, hM 1 ; H 1 ; F 1 i; : : : and a sequence C 1 ; C 2 ; : : : of variants of de nite clauses of P, such that each hM i+1 ; H i+1 ; F i+1 i is derived from hM i ; H i ; F i i and C i+1 by using R and R E .
De nition 40 Let R be a re ection principle, (P; E) a logic program and G a de nite goal. An SLD R -refutation of (P; E) fGg is a nite SLD R -derivation of (P; E) fGg which has a success state as last state in the derivation. If the success state is of the form hfg; H n ; F n i, we say that the refutation has length n.
Properties of SLD R -resolution
In this section we present the results of soundness and completeness of SLD R -resolution with respect to the least re ective E-model.
Soundness
To prove soundness of SLD R -resolution we use the following de nition.
De nition 41 Let (P; E) be a logic program and G a de nite goal. Suppose that hfg; H; Fi is the success state of an SLD R -refutation of (P; E) fGg. Then hH; Fi is a computed answer for (P; E) fGg.
The next theorem states the main soundness result, i.e., that computed answers are correct.
Theorem 42 (Soundness of SLD R -resolution) Let (P; E) be a logic program and G a de nite goal. Every computed answer for (P; E) fGg is a correct answer for (P; E) fGg.
Furthermore, the following result is an immediate consequence.
Corollary 43 Let (P; E) be a logic program and G a de nite goal. Suppose that there exists an SLD R -refutation of (P; E) fGg. Then (P; E) fGg is re ectively E-unsatis able.
De nition 44 The success set of a logic program (P; E) is the set of all ground atoms A such that (P; E) f Ag has an SLD R -refutation.
Notice that atoms in the success set need not be in normal form, that is, they may contain occurrences of the operators " and #.
As ground atoms may contain occurrences of " and #, while re ective E-models only contain representative forms of such atoms, the success set of a logic program is in general not contained in its least re ective E-model. However, this property holds if we consider the representative forms of ground atoms. (Recall that the representative form of a ground atom A is written as dAe.) Corollary 45 If a ground atom A belongs to the success set of a logic program (P; E), then dAe is contained in the least re ective E-model of (P; E). "n. This is an extension of the result due to Apt and van Emden 4] . We use the following de nition.
De nition 46 The closure of an atom A, indicated as (A), is the set of representative elements of all ground instances of A, (A) = fdBe j for every ground instance B of Ag: Theorem 47 Let (P; E) be a logic program and G a de nite goal A 1 ; : : : ; A k . Suppose (P; E) fGg has an SLD R -refutation of length n with computed answer hH n ; F n i. Then, S k j=1 (A j c H n c H 0 ) T R (P;E) "n, for every E-solution H 0 of F n .
Completeness
The main result of this section is the completeness of SLD R -resolution. This result holds if the transformation system that is the parameter of SLD R -resolution converges. We begin our argument for completeness by appropriately rephrasing the Lifting Lemma 48 (Lifting lemma) Let (P; E) be a logic program, H a Herbrand assignment and G a de nite goal. Suppose there exists an SLD R -refutation of (P; E) fG b Hg with success state hfg; H n ; F n i. If R E is convergent, then there exists an SLD Rrefutation of (P; E) fGg of the same length with success state hfg; H 0 n ; F 0 n i such that hH 0 n ; F 0 n ; Hi =) R E hH n ; F n ; fgi.
The rst completeness result gives the converse of Corollary 45.
Theorem 49 Let (P; E) be a logic program. A ground atom A belongs to the success set of (P; E) if and only if dAe is contained in the least re ective E-model of (P; E). Theorem 50 Let (P; E) be a logic program and G a de nite goal. Suppose that (P; E) fGg is re ectively E-unsatis able. Then there exists an SLD R -refutation of (P; E) fGg.
Next we turn attention to correct answers. It is not possible to prove the exact converse of Theorem 42 because computed answers are always more \general" than correct answers with respect to the variables and the metavariables x 1 ; : : : ; x n contained in the de nite goal. However, we can prove that every correct answer is an instance of a computed answer with respect to x 1 ; : : : ; x n . To do this, we use the following result.
Lemma 51 Let (P; E) be a logic program and A an atom. Suppose that x 1 ; : : : ; x n are all the variables and the metavariables occurring in A and that 8x 1 : : : 8x n A is a re ective logical E-consequence of (P; E). Then, there exists an SLD R -refutation of (P; E) f Ag with computed answer hH; Fi such that E j = 8x 1 : : : 8x n 9(H F).
Example 52 Consider the equality theory NT. Let (P; E) be the logic program: (fp(x) Y = "xg ; NT ) ; where x is a variable and Y a metavariable. Then, 8z(p(z)) is a re ective logical E-consequence of (P; E). In fact, the name equation Y = "x is satis ed for every value of x. A computed answer for the goal p(z) is hfz = xg; fY = "xgi. It holds that UN j = 8z9x9Y (z = x^Y = "x). Now we are in the position to state the main completeness result.
Theorem 53 (Completeness of SLD R -resolution) Let (P; E) be a logic program and G a de nite goal. If R E is convergent, then for every correct answer hH; Fi for (P; E) fGg, there exists a computed answer hH 0 ; F 0 i for (P; E) fGg. Furthermore 
Applications
The main proposal of the present paper is the novel use of re ection principles as a paradigm for the representation of knowledge in a computational logic setting. The claim is that in many cases well-chosen re ection principles can adequately, clearly and concisely represent the basic features and properties of a domain. Though some technical developments shown in this paper are quite intricate, they serve as the behind-the-scenes sound de nition and operation of the proposed system. Users shall not be concerned with most of them, except for those which are aimed at helping users to tailor the system to their speci c needs.
To substantiate this claim, in this section we o er examples of how to use the system capabilities in three di erent representation problems. Overall, we hope that this section also shows how one concept and tool (i.e., re ection principles) can be used in such di erent application areas, that they would otherwise be (and in the literature are) handled by di erent formalisms and techniques; in other words, re ection principles actually work as a knowledge representation paradigm.
On purpose, we recall some of the application domains we have studied in the past, so as to show how the previous ad hoc formulations can be rephrased as particular instances of the new framework that we propose in this paper.
Re ective Prolog
The rst example of application of RCL to the de nition of an actual deductive system concerns a metalogic Horn clause language with an extended resolution principle. This language is called Re ective Prolog, and is described in detail in 24]. Re ective Prolog (RP for short) has been de ned and implemented by (some of) the authors of this papers: for them it has been the seminal work which stimulated the rst intuition of the concepts that, with time and thought, have led to the formalization of RCL. Then, turning back, it is interesting to see how the new general framework we are now presenting is able to express that language that is, in a sense, its ancestor.
The axiomatization of the naming mechanism of Re ective Prolog as an equality theory (computationally characterized by a rewrite system), which is the rst step for de ning Re ective Prolog in RCL, is described in 9].
As concerns the Re ective Prolog inference rule, i.e., RSLD-resolution, we may notice that it can be seen as a form of SLD R -resolution which uses re ection axioms implicitly present in the program. Thus, RSLD-resolution can be expressed in RCL by two re ection principles: re ection down and re ection up.
Re ection down makes any conclusion drawn at the metaevaluation level available (re ected down) to the object level. Re ection down can be represented by the following re ection principle D. Let ; X 1 ; : : : ; X n ]) X 1 = "t 1 ; : : : ; X n = "t n ; e 1 ; : : : ; e q ; A 1 ; : : : ; A m .
RSLD-resolution can then be de ned by the following re ection principle RP.
Thus, SLD RP -resolution is able to use clauses with conclusion solve(X) to resolve a goal A (downward re ection), and, vice versa, clauses with conclusion A to resolve a goal solve(X) (upward re ection).
Below we reformulate in RCL an old example, which is suitable to show how metaevaluation clauses can play the role of additional clauses for object level predicates.
Example 54 Let where NT is the equality theory de ned in De nition 6. The rst clause in P de nes the usual concept of symmetry of a relation: the objects with names Y and Z are in the relation with name X, provided that the relation denoted by X is asserted to be symmetric and that the objects denoted by Z and Y are in the relation denoted by X. The second clause states that the relation p is symmetric, and the last clause partially de nes the relation p.
As p is the only binary predicate symbol in P, the re ection axioms of P are the following:
RP ( . Now we can prove p(b; a) from P by applying SLD RP -resolution.
Notice that p(b; a) does not logically follow from (P; E) without re ection principles. In fact, the least E-model and re ective E-model of (P; E) are respectively: M (P;E) = dp(a; b)e; dsymmetric(p Thus, by means of re ection up and re ection down, the rst clause of P becomes an axiomatization of symmetry, which can be applied whenever necessary.
In summary, it can be useful to explicitly state the di erence between Re ective Prolog as it was originally de ned, and its formalization in RCL.
RP had an ad hoc extended uni cation treating a xed naming, while in RCL the naming is axiomatized and treated by means of rewrite rules. RP had a unique hard-wired re ection principle, while in RCL any re ection principle most appropriate to the domain can be expressed; this also implies that the above re ection principle could cohexist in the same system with other re ection principles, for instance those introduced in the following Subsections. RP semantics was de ned in a speci c way, while its reformulation in RCL is given a semantics as an instance of the general schema given in previous Sections. Precisely, the concepts of extended Herbrand base and extended interpretation were absolutely ad hoc; the concept of a re ective model for RP can be considered as a rough rst sketch which, in time, has evolved into the more general concept presented in this paper.
Communication-Based Reasoning
Another problem that we have discussed in a previous paper 20] concerns the ability to represent agents and multi-agent cooperation, which is central to many AI applications. In the context of communication-based reasoning, the interaction among agents is based on communication acts.
Communication acts are formalized by means of the predicate symbols tell and told. They both take as rst argument the name of a theory symbol and as second argument the name of an expression of the language. Let ! and be theory symbols and A an atom. The intended meaning of !:tell( Its intuitive meaning is that every time an atom of the form tell( 1 ; Z) can be derived from a theory ! (which means that agent ! wants to communicate proposition Z to agent ), the atom told(Y; Z) is consequently derived also in the theory (which means that proposition Z becomes available to agent ).
We propose an example to show in some detail what is the declarative semantics of a program, and how SLD R -resolution works. The least E-model and re ective E-model of (P; E) are respectively: 
Plausible Reasoning
Plausible reasoning is a suitable realm of application of re ection principles. In fact, most forms of plausible reasoning reinterpret available premises to draw plausible conclusions.
In logic programming, given a program P, viewed as divided into two subprograms P s and P t (which play the role of the source and the target domain, respectively), analogy can be procedurally performed by transforming rules in P s into analogous rules in P t . The analogous rules can be computed by means of partial identity between terms of the two domains 37], or by means of predicate analogies and term correspondence 25].
In particular, let us assume that predicates with the same name in P s and P t are in analogy by default. Let us also assume an explicit declaration is provided of analogy between predicates or, more generally, between terms of the two programs (this declaration is called term correspondence). Then, given a goal which is not provable in P t , this goal may possibly be provable by analogy, and in particular by adapting a suitably selected rule of the source program P s . Given a term correspondence, this rule can be transformed into an analogous rule, composed of predicates and terms of the target program, to be used in proving the given goal. Notice that the new rule is not actually added to P t , but just constructed and used \on the y".
A deductive system which acts in this way can be easily formalized in RCL. In this case no encoding device is needed (this is not a metaprogramming application). Nevertheless, the machinery for de ning encodings can be \recycled" for de ning term analogies. In particular, substitutions used for uni cation can be seen as particular cases of correspondences. Thus, term correspondences can be composed with substitutions, giving a new term correspondence as a result.
The inference rule implementing this kind of analogical reasoning can be expressed in terms of a re ection principle A de ned below. Given a set S of predicate analogies and a term correspondence , de ne a relation r as: A(x) = fy j r(x; y) holds g:
The re ective semantics of this kind of analogical reasoning can be de ned as follows. Given a logic program (P; E), it can be divided into two subprograms, (P s ; E) and (P t ; E), as mentioned above. Let U Ps , B Ps and pred(P s ) (resp., U Pt , B Pt , pred(P t )) be the Herbrand universe, the E-base and the set of predicate symbols of P s (resp., P t ). The mapping T A (P;E)
, which allows the derivation of analogical consequences as outlined above, characterizes the consequences of P t with respect to the clauses of P t itself and the clauses of P s .
Related Work and Concluding Remarks
In Section 1 we gave general references to the ample subject of metalevel architectures and re ection and in Section 2 we reviewed the basic literature on this matter. In this section, we make an attempt to more speci cally relate our approach to other proposals advanced in several contexts, since we wish to emphasize that it might be helpful, at least conceptually, to ful ll the needs arising in diverse problem domains such as software engineering, automated reasoning and theorem proving, knowledge representation and machine learning. Though the novelty of the proposed paradigm does not allow a direct comparison with other work, we will try to highlight possible commonalities with approaches having similar objectives put forward in di erent elds. Several authors, especially in the logic programming community, have considered the utility of building program schemata that may represent a whole class of speci c programs having a similar structure.
Kwok and Sergot 46] suggest \to write a logic program implicitly by stating the de ning property which characterises it" and show that \implicitly-de ned programs may be used to simulate higher-order functions, de ne programs containing an in nite number of clauses and reuse existing programs". They, however, \do not give speci c proposals on how to extend existing languages by utilising this technique".
Barker- Plummer 6] proposes an extension to the Prolog language to write commonly occurring program forms (called cliches) just once but to reuse them in a variety of ways, and implements this method by means of Prolog metaprograms. Fuchs 33] observes that \since the beginning of logic programming it has been recognized that many logic programs ... are structured similarly, and can be understood as instances of program schemata". The objective is to transform an instance of one program schema into an instance of another, to get a transformed program that is more e cient than the original. The paper deals with transformation schemata which represent speci c transformation strategies. Transformations generate equivalent programs in that the least Herbrand model and the computed answers are preserved. Yokomori 74] proposes logic program forms as sets of Horn clauses whose atoms may have uninstantiated predicate name variables. An instantiation (called interpretation) of a logic program form F is obtained by mapping the predicate name variables appearing in F to predicate names, and from the variables appearing in F to terms, under suitable restrictions. Instead of n programs having the same structure, one logic form can thus be given, together with n interpretations. This is therefore a rather static approach, where neither a proof theory nor a model theory is involved.
All of the above-mentioned approaches can be represented in Re ective Prolog, which in turn is a particular instantiation of RCL as shown in Section 6.1.
Pfenning 58] calls \logical frameworks" a metalanguage for the speci cation of deductive systems, and argues that: \Logical frameworks are subject to the same general design principles as other programming or speci cation languages. They should be as simple and uniform as possible, yet they should provide concise means to express the concepts and methods of the intended application domain". While surveying several frameworks, he remarks that \research in logical framework is still in its infancy".
We refer the reader to the literature mentioned in the introduction for many other metalevel architectures, systems and languages that have been proposed, in particular those not involving re ection that therefore we have not explicitly mentioned. The approach discussed in the present paper di ers from all of this work in that it is intended to show that, instead of de ning di erent architectures and languages for di erent knowledge representation, reasoning and learning tasks, it su ces to represent the latter as re ection principles in one and the same single language, as we have attempted to show in the examples of Section 6.
Considering in particular the application of the general framework presented in this paper to the eld of metalogic languages, Re ective Prolog (Section 6.1) has been compared to the other main approaches in 24]. A more recent approach, not considered there, is that of 39], which is very similar to 24] about the treatment of naming and uni cation, except for providing multiple theories, and names for theories. Theories are able to exchange formulae that they can prove, by means of a distinguished binary predicate demo, appearing explicitly in the body of clauses, and having the name of a theory as the rst argument, and the name of a formula as the second argument. It is interesting to notice that this approach could be easily modeled in RCL: theory communication could be modeled as in Section 6.2, using demo on both sides (instead of tell/told), and demo could be forced to convey provable formulae by means of the re ection principle U (Re ection up) of Section 6.1, with demo instead of solve.
Finally, let us review how the present paper relates to our own previous work on the matter.
A language for building re ective, non-conservative extensions of Horn clause theories was rst proposed in 22] and fully de ned formally in 24]. The system was then augmented with a re ective, non-monotonic negation apt to represent non-monotonic reasoning 23]. A formalization of analogical reasoning in this re ective logic was elaborated in 25]. Re ection was used to represent communication among di erent theories/agents in 10, 20] . The very idea that a common view underlying such diverse contexts could be systematized in the unifying framework of re ection principles was rst advanced in 21]. In order to achieve a more language-independent formulation of re ection principles, the system's syntactical apparatus (language and proof theory) was then parametrized, using equational name theories for encoding facilities, and associated rewriting systems for substitution facilities 8, 9] . The present paper represents a new attempt to both clarify the role of re ection principles at the knowledge level and to formalize it at this enhanced technical level.
To summarize, the RCL system proposed in this paper is intended to be a logical framework:
theoretically well founded with proved semantic properties; carefully designed in both the basic features and the exible parametrical ones; fully worked out in all the technical details; practically implementable with known state-of-the art techniques;
wide in scope with respect to the set of tasks representable with it (from software engineering to knowledge representation, from common-sense reasoning to theorem proving); based on a single concept (the proposed form of re ection principles) for uniformly addressing these di erent tasks and domains; aimed at two classes of potential users: (i) those who may nd its basic default features su cient for their applications and by sticking to them are guaranteed with respect to soundness and completeness and (ii) those who may wish to exploit its constructive parametrical features to experiment with tailored forms of encodings and resolution re ection principles for more sophisticated applications and accept the burden of checking the holding of the required semantic properties. We now wish to conclude the paper with a disclaimer. We believe re ection to be a powerful concept, yet a di cult one both theoretically and for practical implementations. Our system is limited to the extent that it is based on enhanced Horn clauses (not full rst-order logic) for both language and metalanguage, with the same inference rule (SLD-resolution), which is di erent from other approaches that use distinct languages and/or inference systems. We are aware that the system we have proposed is just one single point in a huge space of possibilities, largely still to be explored. Some steps have been taken very recently towards establishing a groundwork for comparing di erent kinds of re ection and for studying their underlying theoretical properties (e.g., in 18, 54]). Our contribution is an e ort to include re ection in the reconciliation of logic and computation that we feel is very much to be in the spirit and (we may say by now) the tradition of computational logic and logic programming.
In the next future, RCL will be fully implemented, taking as a starting point the existing implementation of Re ective Prolog, which is fully working, and has been used in several applications.
A Appendix
Proposition 30 Let (P; E) be a logic program and A 1 ; : : : ; A k be a ground de nite goal. Then (P; E) f A 1 ; : : : ; A k g is re ectively E-unsatis able if and only if A 1:
: :^A k is a re ective logical E-consequence of (P; E).
Proof Suppose that (P; E) f A 1 ; : : : ; A k g is re ectively E-unsatis able. Let I be any E-interpretation of (P; E). Assume that I is a re ective E-model of (P; E).
As (P; E) f A 1 ; : : : ; A k g is re ectively E-unsatis able, I cannot be a re ective E-model of :(A 1^: : :^A k ). Hence, each atom A i , 1 i k, is true under I, i.e., I
is a re ective E-model for every A i . Consequently A 1^: : :^A k is a re ective logical E-consequence of (P; E).
Conversely, suppose that A 1^: : :^A k is a re ective logical E-consequence of (P; E). Let I be an E-interpretation of (P; E) and assume that I is a re ective Emodel of (P; E). Then I is also a re ective E-model of A 1^: : :^A k . Hence, I is not a re ective E-model of :(A 1^: : :^A k ). Consequently, (P; E) f A 1 ; : : : ; A k g is re ectively E-unsatis able.
Proposition 32 Let R be a re ection principle and I an E-interpretation of a logic program (P; E). The mapping T R (P;E) is continuous.
Proof Let X be a subset of 2 B (P;E) . Notice rst that fdA 1 e; : : : ; dA m eg lub(X) i fdA 1 e; : : : ; dA m eg I, for some I 2 X. In order to show that T R (P;E) is continuous, we have to show that T R (P;E) (lub(X)) = lub(T R (P;E) (X)), for each directed subset X of 2 B (P;E) . Now we have that dAe 2 T R (P;E) (lub(X)) i (A e 1 ; : : : ; e q ; A 1 ; : : : ; A m ) 2 ground(P R(P)), E j = e i for all i, 1 1 ) is a logical E-consequence of (P; E) and, therefore, also a re ective logical E-consequence of (P; E). hH n?1 ; F n?1 ; S n i =) R E hH n ; F n ; fgi:
As H is a Herbrand assignment, i.e., a a set of equations in solved form, this holds hfg; fg; Hi =) R E hH; fg; fgi:
Finally, by convergency of R E hfg; fg; S 1 : : : S n Hi =) R E hH n ; F n ; fgi or, equivalently, hfg; fg; S 1 : : : S n i =) R E hH 0 n ; F 0 n ; fgi and hH 0 n ; F 0 n ; Hi =) R E hH n ; F n ; fgi: Theorem 49 Let (P; E) be a logic program. A ground atom A belongs to the success set of (P; E) if and only if dAe is contained in the least re ective E-model of (P; E). Proof By Corollary 45, it su ces to show that, if dAe belongs to the least re ective E-model of (P; E), then A is contained in the success set of (P; E). Suppose that dAe is in the least re ective E-model of (P; E). Then by Theorem 34, dAe 2 T R (P;E) "n, for some n 2 !. We prove by induction on n that if dAe 2 T R (P;E) "n, then (P; E) f Ag has a SLD R -refutation and hence A is in the success set of (P; E).
Base Case (n = 1) This means that dAe 2 T R (P;E) "1. We distinguish between two cases.
Case 1
A is a ground atom of the form p(t 1 ; : : : ; t h ) and there exists a unit clause in P, say p(t 0 1 ; : : : ; t 0 h ) , such that E j = 9(t 1 = t 0 1^:
: :^t h = t 0 h ). By soundness of =) R E , hfg; fg; ft 1 = t 0 1 ; : : : ; t h = t 0 h gi =) R E hH; fg; fgi, for some Herbrand assignment H. Then, by the de nition of SLD R -resolution (case 1), (P; E) f p(t 1 ; : : : ; t h )g has an SLD R -refutation. Case 2 A is a ground atom of the form p(t 1 ; : : : ; t h ) and there exists a clause C in P such that R(C) contains a unit clause of the form p(t 0 1 ; : : : ; t 0 h ) and E j = 9(t 1 = t 0 1^:
: :^t h = t 0 h ). By soundness of =) R E , hfg; fg; ft 1 = t 0 1 ; : : : ; t h = t 0 h gi =) R E hH; fg; fgi, for some Herbrand assignment H. Then, by the de nition of SLD R -resolution (case 2), (P; E) f p(t 1 ; : : : ; t h )g has an SLD R -refutation.
